(PHP 5 >= 5.1.0, PHP 7, PECL pdo >= 0.2.1)
PDO::quote — Quotes a string for use in a query.
$string
[, int $parameter_type = PDO::PARAM_STR
] )PDO::quote() places quotes around the input string (if required) and escapes special characters within the input string, using a quoting style appropriate to the underlying driver.
If you are using this function to build SQL statements, you are strongly recommended to use PDO::prepare() to prepare SQL statements with bound parameters instead of using PDO::quote() to interpolate user input into an SQL statement. Prepared statements with bound parameters are not only more portable, more convenient, immune to SQL injection, but are often much faster to execute than interpolated queries, as both the server and client side can cache a compiled form of the query.
Not all PDO drivers implement this method (notably PDO_ODBC). Consider using prepared statements instead.
The character set must be set either on the server level, or within the database connection itself (depending on the driver) for it to affect PDO::quote(). See the driver-specific documentation for more information.
stringThe string to be quoted.
parameter_typeProvides a data type hint for drivers that have alternate quoting styles.
Returns a quoted string that is theoretically safe to pass into an
SQL statement. Returns FALSE if the driver does not support quoting in
this way.
Example #1 Quoting a normal string
<?php
$conn = new PDO('sqlite:/home/lynn/music.sql3');
/* Simple string */
$string = 'Nice';
print "Unquoted string: $string\n";
print "Quoted string: " . $conn->quote($string) . "\n";
?>
以上例程会输出：
Unquoted string: Nice Quoted string: 'Nice'
Example #2 Quoting a dangerous string
<?php
$conn = new PDO('sqlite:/home/lynn/music.sql3');
/* Dangerous string */
$string = 'Naughty \' string';
print "Unquoted string: $string\n";
print "Quoted string:" . $conn->quote($string) . "\n";
?>
以上例程会输出：
Unquoted string: Naughty ' string Quoted string: 'Naughty '' string'
Example #3 Quoting a complex string
<?php
$conn = new PDO('sqlite:/home/lynn/music.sql3');
/* Complex string */
$string = "Co'mpl''ex \"st'\"ring";
print "Unquoted string: $string\n";
print "Quoted string: " . $conn->quote($string) . "\n";
?>
以上例程会输出：
Unquoted string: Co'mpl''ex "st'"ring Quoted string: 'Co''mpl''''ex "st''"ring'
In foundation quoting is bad idea,there always will be possibillity to escape or fraud quote function ,better solution,i mean best solution is using this function : htmlentities($string, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') which translate quote into ' and $string translated like this can't affect on your code.
This function also converts new lines to \r\n
When converting from the old mysql_ functions to PDO, note that the quote function isn't exactly the same as the old mysql_real_escape_string function. It escapes, but also adds quotes; hence the name I guess :-)
After I replaced mysql_real_escape_string with $pdo->quote, it took me a bit to figure out why my strings were turning up in results with quotes around them. I felt like a fool when I realized all I needed to do was change ...\"".$pdo->quote($foo)."\"... to ...".$pdo->quote($foo)."...
One have to understand that string formatting has nothing to do with identifiers.
And thus string formatting should NEVER ever be used to format an identifier ( table of field name).
To quote an identifier, you have to format it as identifier, not as string.
To do so you have to
- Enclose identifier in backticks.
- Escape backticks inside by doubling them.
So, the code would be:
<?php
function quoteIdent($field) {
return "`".str_replace("`","``",$field)."`";
}
?>
this will make your identifier properly formatted and thus invulnerable to injection.
However, there is another possible attack vector - using dynamical identifiers in the query may give an outsider control over fields the aren't allowed to:
Say, a field user_role in the users table and a dynamically built INSERT query based on a $_POST array may allow a privilege escalation with easily forged $_POST array.
Or a select query which let a user to choose fields to display may reveal some sensitive information to attacker.
To prevent this kind of attack yet keep queries dynamic, one ought to use WHITELISTING approach.
Every dynamical identifier have to be checked against a hardcoded whitelist like this:
<?php
$allowed = array("name","price","qty");
$key = array_search($_GET['field'], $allowed));
if ($key == false) {
throw new Exception('Wrong field name');
}
$field = $db->quoteIdent($allowed[$key]);
$query = "SELECT $field FROM t"; //value is safe
?>
(Personally I wouldn't use a query like this, but that's just an example of using a dynamical identifier in the query).
And similar approach have to be used when filtering dynamical arrays for insert and update:
<?php
function filterArray($input,$allowed)
{
foreach(array_keys($input) as $key )
{
if ( !in_array($key,$allowed) )
{
unset($input[$key]);
}
}
return $input;
}
//used like this
$allowed = array('title','url','body','rating','term','type');
$data = $db->filterArray($_POST,$allowed);
// $data now contains allowed fields only
// and can be used to create INSERT or UPDATE query dynamically
?>
Note that this function just does what the documentation says: It escapes special characters in strings.
It does NOT - however - detect a "NULL" value. If the value you try to quote is "NULL" it will return the same value as when you process an empty string (-> ''), not the text "NULL".